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Abstract:   Abstract: This paper employs a simultaneous equations approach to measuring the
tradeoffs between risk, capitalization and measured inefficiencies in a sample of 254 large bank
holding companies over the period 1986 through 1991. The results confirm the belief that
these three variables are simultaneously determined. Furthermore, asymmetries were
identified in the relationship between risk and inefficiencies. Support was found in the asset
risk equations for the hypothesis that less efficient institutions took on more risk to off set this
inefficiency, thereby transferring risk to the deposit insurance finds. Similarly, less efficient
institutions tended to be less well capitalized, a result that may also be associated with
differences in management quality. Finally, evidence is provided that risk averse managers
tend to expend real resources to reduce asset risk, which makes them appear to be inefficient,
when compared to efficiency measures derived under the assumption of risk neutrality.I. Introduction
Recent work by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Jacques and Nigro (1995) suggest that
changes in bank capital and risk positioning by bank management are simultaneously determined
and are affected by both exogenous and endogenous factors. In general, management tends to
offset increases in capital with increases in risk, but also these tradeoffs are significantly affected
by regulatory pressure.
1 In particular, regulatory pressure, as reflected in the new risk-based
bank capital requirements seems to have been effective in offsetting tendencies for banks with low
capital to increase their risk taking and to engage in moral hazard behavior.
In separate work, Kwan and Eisenbeis(1996) indicate that there are also tradeoffs between
inefficiencies and bank risk taking and that the market prices both bank risk and inefficiencies.
These two streams of research suggest that it may be important to investigate further how
management reacts to the market pricing of efficiencies and bank risk, and how this affects bank
capital decisions as compared with incentives to engage in excessive perquisite consumption
and/or increased risk taking. In particular, Jensen(1986) and Stultz(1990) imply that there are
theoretical reasons to believe that agency costs and information asymmetries may significantly
impact these tradeoffs and may explain why some institutions react to increased costs of capital by
taking on more risk, why some may consume perquisites and why others may reduce risk.
We draw upon agency theory to specify a simultaneous equations system which attempts
to disentangle the differing incentives for management in managing risk, producing intermediation
services and leveraging the organization, and how these incentives may be affected by regulatory
1 See Jacques and Nigro(1995).actions. The remainder of this paper first reviews the theoretical considerations and models of
bank leverage, risk taking and inefficiencies. We then present the model and data. These are
followed by a discussion of the empirical results. The last section presents the Summary and
Conclusion.
II. Tradeoffs Between Risk Taking, Leverage and Risk
The interplay among leverage, risk and investment incentives and the effects on firm value
have received attention in the corporate finance literature with the development of theories of
asymmetric information and agency. It clearly suggests that the direction of causation may be
two-way.
Jensen(l986), for example, argues that the role of managers as agents for stockholders, is
fraught with conflicts of interest which can affect asset selection, firm behavior, efficiency and
performance. Managers, especially if they are risk averse, seek to maximize their own explicit and
implicit compensation at the expense of shareholders.
2 Since both managerial compensation and
power are typically linked to firm growth and larger firm size, management is may be incented to
maximize firm growth beyond efficient size. This, of course, decreases operational efficiency,
lowers returns and works against the interests of shareholders.
Theory also suggests that agency problems will induce managers to avoid monitoring by
the capital markets by relying upon internal as opposed to external financing of investments. In
fact, they will tend to over-invest in projects, including investing in negative net present value
2 Differences in risk aversion between owners and managers may bean important source of this conflict. We know
that less risk averse institutions will choose higher leverage and risk With risk neutral shareholder, only returns matter.
If managers are risk averse and shareholders are risk neutral, then conflicts over portfolio selection will result.projects, and/or engage in inefficient behavior whenever there is free cash available.
3 This
problem of investment and its financing becomes more acute when there is asymmetric
information on the quality of investment projects between management and the shareholders. In
the case of banks, it is generally thought that their assets are opaque, and hence, this asymmetric
information problem may be particularly acute with respect to their asset choice.
Asymmetric information, as Stultz(1990) notes, can not only lead to inefficient investment
when cash flow is high, it can also inhibit efficient investment choice when free cash flow is low
and the firm does have NPV investment projects. The problem is that shareholders understand
management’s incentives to overinvest, and hence, there is little that management can do to signal
to shareholders that NPV projects are available, but sufficient investment finds are available to
the firm to take advantage of these investments.
A partial solution to this problem is related to the choice of leverage. Jensen(1986) points
out that not only are there agency costs to debt, debt can also seine a positive function in inducing
managers to behave efficiently. While managers can promise to pay out free cash flow to
shareholders through announcements of permanent changes in dividend payouts, Jensen points
out that dividends can always be reduced in subsequent periods, and therefore, such
announcements lack credibility. However, issuance of debt can provide a more permanent and
credible way of disbursing free cash flow.
4 In effect, debt serves a bonding function and reduces
3 Jensen(1986) defines free cash flow as “cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net
present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital.”
4 Jensen argues that the proceeds of the debt issue aren’t retained.the agency costs associated with free cash flow. Greater leverage also overcomes institutional
resistance to entrenchment, which the free cash flow hypothesis assumes.
Counterbalancing these positive aspects of debt issuance and increased leverage are
increased agency costs of debt. As leverage is increased, bankruptcy and related costs also
increase which ameliorate the incentives to issue debt.
The implicit model implied by this analysis implies that inefficiency should be positively related
to firm asset risk to the extent that managers are induced to take on negative net present value projects,
or in the case of banks, to invest in lower quality loans. It also implies that inefficiency would be
positively related to firm growth in that firms would be induced to grow beyond efficient size. Finally,
inefficiency should be related to leverage, although it is not clear whether the bonding incentives or
agency costs of debt would dominate.
As slightly different hypothesis concerning the relationship between inefficiency and risk taking
which has the opposite sign prediction is offered by Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon(l994). They
note that the traditional production functions and efficiency estimates are derived under the assumption
of risk neutrality. However, managers may be risk averse rather than risk neutral, especially when a
substantial portion of their wealth or human capital is tied to the performance of the firm. Hence,
under risk aversion, managers may be willing to trade off reduced earnings for reduced risk. In doing
so, they incur additional costs in initially making loans and in monitoring loan performance, which
would show up as measured inefficiencies. Under the Hughes, Lang, Mester and Moon hypothesis
then, one would expect to see a positive relationship between measures of asset quality and
inefficiencies, with higher measures of loan quality being associated with greater inefficiencies.
5
5 Alternatively, higher loan quality would be associated with greater measure inefficiencies.The literature also suggests that bank risk may not only affect leverage and inefficiencies, but
also may itself be dependent upon leverage and inefficiencies. Management may be induced to offset
higher capitalization by taking more risk. In banking, the leverage decision is further complicated
by the existence of deposit insurance and regulation, which change some of the inferences one
might draw from the corporate finance literature. Of primary concern are the effects that
regulation and the structure of federal deposit insurance have on bank risk and return tradeoffs in
a portfolio theoretic framework. It examines the effects that mispriced deposit insurance has had
on bank incentives to take risk and to exploit the deposit insurance subsidy. This theoretical and
empirical work indicates that the value of deposit insurance increases as asset risk and leverage
increase.
6 In the presence of fixed rate deposit insurance and imperfect monitoring, these models
would imply that the incentives to take on additional risk would be unbounded. Empirically,
however, such behavior has not been observed, perhaps because of the bankruptcy costs reflected
in the possible loss of a valuable bank charter and related considerations raised by Kwan(1990)
and Keeley(1988).
Theory also demonstrates that there is an isomorphism between risk related premiums to
control moral hazard behavior and capital standards designed to limit risk taking. Once this
correspondence between risk-based premiums and bank capital requirements became understood,
concern began to be expressed that increases in regulatory capital requirements may have the
perverse effect of inducing institutions to take on more risk to offset higher capital requirements
rather than to induce institutions to operate in a more safe and sound manner. Others turned to
better understanding the role of monitoring and attempts to offset the incentives of institutions to
6 There is no consideration in the banking literature of the benefits that leverage may have in affecting firm efficiency or
investment policy.modify their portfolios, once capital decisions had been made, or risk-related premiums
established, to rebalance portfolios to take on more risk. In particular, both Koehn and
Santomero(l980) and Kim and Santomero(1988) suggest that increases in bank capital
requirements would induce bank risk taking and have perverse effects on bank safety. Furlong
and Keeley(1990) and Keeley and Furlong(1989), however, demonstrate that this conclusion
depends upon the assumption of a constant cost of funds, and therefore, it ignores the impacts
that increased capital would have on reducing the risk exposure of debtholders who would accept
lower returns. Hence overall bank returns would be enhanced by increased capital requirements,’
The positive correlation between returns and capital has been demonstrated by Berger(1994).
Shrieves and Dahl argue that the theoretical models suggest that whether there is a
negative or positive relationship between bank risk and leverage depends upon the marginal
benefits and costs of leverage and asset risk, which is strongly impacted by the size of the deposit
insurance subsidy. Furthermore, this relationship changes as leverage and risk vary, since the
option value of the deposit insurance subsidy has been shown to be nonlinear in both risk and
leverage. They posit a partial adjustment simultaneous equation system which models the
interactions between changes in risk, measured on an overall basis, changes in non performing
loans, and changes in capital. Shrieves and Dahl find evidence that, even for banks that are not
constrained by regulation, changes in capital and risk are positively related. Jacques and
Nigro(l995) extend the work of Shrieves and Dahl in a simultaneous equations model to capture
the relationship between changes in bank capital, portfolio risk and risk-based capital standards.
7 Given that monitoring was not perfect and that most banks’ debt was not freely traded, the question arose as to why
banks did not appear to pursue corner solutions and take on greater and greater risk, especially as capital ratios declined.
One possible explanation was the existence of valuable charters which would be lost if management adopted portfolio
strategies that would be optimal in a single period decision making world.Their empirical work suggests that the new risk-based capital standards brought about increased
in bank capital and reductions in risk, even for those institutions that were not capital-constrained.
This banking work has not considered the implications that Jensen’s analysis suggests
about the linkage between bank leverage, risk taking and investment decisions and inefficiencies.
In particular, this work implies that, for certain institutions (those with free cash flow), reduced
leverage - higher capital - may intent managers to consume more perquisites, operate more
inefficiently and over invest. For other institutions, however, greater inefficiencies would be
associated with poorer operating performance, and when coupled with greater leverage, would be
associated with higher risks of bankruptcy. With mispriced deposit insurance, higher risk and
greater leverage would imply stronger incentives to engage in moral hazard behavior since the
option value of shifting risk to the FDIC would be greater. Finally, examiners have long observed
that firms with rapid rates of growth tend to also take on more risk. Counterbalancing these
incentives to take on unlimited risk would be the potential loss of valuable charter values, lost of
firm specific human capital on the part of management, and increased incentives for regulatory
oversight and intervention.
Taken together, the analysis implies that bank leverage, asset risk and inefficiencies are
simultaneously determined and can be expressed in general terms as follows:
Inefficiencies = f(leverage, asset quality, growth)
Asset risk = g(inefficiencies, asset composition, and asset growth)
Leverage = h(inefficiencies, Regulatory Capital Constraints, Asset Returns)
(1)
(2)
(3)Following Jensen’s arguments, the first equation suggests that agency problems will lead
risk averse managers to opt for higher growth, higher leverage and lower asset quality, which will
maximize their own welfare at the expense of share holders and will lead to inefficiencies and
excess perquisite consumption. The second equation captures the belief that agency costs and
risk neutrality will lead managers to select risky assets, invest free cash flow in negative net
present value projects, consume excess perquisites and grow the firm to maximize their own
welfare at the expense of shareholders. It also reflects the observation by bank examiners that
firms pursuing excessive growth strategies may be engaging in moral hazard behavior and taking
on too much risk. Finally, equation (3) captures the relationship between leverage and measures
of risk, asset returns, and regulatory constraints identified in the previous literature. It also
reflects the hypothesis that inefficiencies should be related to capitalization, although it remains an
empirical question whether the bonding incentives of debt, the agency costs of debt or the moral
hazard incentives that inefficient firms would be induced to pursue higher leverage strategies to
shift risk to the deposit insurance funds will dominate.
The next section discusses the data used to estimate the model and the proxy variables
used to capture the general relationships specified in equations (1)-(3).
III. Data
The data employed in this study are from the semiannual Federal Reserve bank holding
company data from 1986 through 1991 obtained from the Y-9 Reports. Since only bank holding
companies with total consolidated assets of $150 million or more, or with more than onesubsidiary bank are required to file the long form of the Y-9 Reports, the sample consists of
larger banking organizations.
A total of 254 bank holding companies were available for estimating the inefficiency
estimates which employed pooled time series-cross section estimation of a stochastic frontier cost
function described fully in the Appendix. 174 companies had complete time-series data for the
entire sample period. The average total assets of the 174 sample firms with non-missing
observations are used to sort these firms into size-based quartiles, since previous work (see Kwan
and Eisenbeis(l995)) suggests that production technologies and outputs varied across banks of
different sizes. The remaining 80 sample firms with missing observations are then classified into
respective size classes using the quartile break points established by the 174 firms at matching
time periods. This classification method ensures that the sample firms stay in the same size class
throughout the study period.
Proxy variables are employed to represent the independent and dependent variables in
equations (1)-(3). The specific equations estimated were:
INEFF = f(BADLOAN, BVCAPITAL, M_LOAN, M_LOAN
2)
BADLOAN = g(INEFF, RE, CI, CS, M_LOAN, M_LOAN
2)





INEFF = stochastic inefficiency score described in Appendix
BADLOAN = (past due loans+ non accruals)/total loans
CAP = book value capital/total assets
M_LOAN = arithmetic average loan growth over past 5 years
M_LOAN
2 = M_LOAN squaredRE = real estate loans to total loans
CI = commercial and industrial loans to total loans
CS = consumer loans to total loans
BASLE = a dummy variable equal to 1 after the risk-based capital requirements were
imposed in 1989 and zero elsewhere
ROA = return on assets,
The principal variables needing explanation in equations (1a)-(3a) are the proxies
for asset risk capital, loan growth, asset composition, regulatory capital constraints and asset
returns. Since the main determinant of asset quality is loan quality, the sum of past due and non
accrual loans were used as a proxy for asset quality. Because the regulatory agencies and prompt
corrective action provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
employ book value capital ratios, the ratio of equity to assets was used to capture institution
capitalization. Loan growth over the past 5 years proxies for asset growth. Since these are the
most labor intensive components of bank assets, it should be most closely related to firm
inefficiency. Loan growth squared was used to reflect any non-linearities that may be implied by
the moral hazard hypothesis. The proportions of real estate loans, commercial and industrial and
consumer loans were used to represent asset category and risk choices. The banking agencies
generally assign real estate loans to lower risk classes in the risk-based capital standards, and it is
generally conceded that consumer loans have different risk characteristics than commercial and
industrial loans. In this case, foreign loans are the omitted category and hence their effects are
impounded in the constant term. To reflect the effects of any regulatory constraints on capital, a
dummy variable was specified to capture when the Basle risk-based capital requirements were
imposed. Finally, return on assets (ROA) is employed to measure asset returns which is assumed
to affect leverage through retained earnings.IV. Empirical Results
The results of the two-stage least squares estimation of equations (1a)-(3a) are contained
in Table 1.8 Results are reported for the four different size category of banks with the smallest
banks being in Group 1 and the largest in Group 4. In general, the coefficients are different
enough to justify the estimation of different equation systems for the various size category of
banks.
A. Inefficiency Equation
In the inefficiency equations, the measures of loan quality are consistently negative and
statistically significant for all except the smallest size category of banks. The sign indicates that as
asset quality declines (BADLOAN increases), measured inefficiencies, derived under the
assumption of risk neutrality, decline. This finding is consistent with the Hughes, Lang, Mester
and Moon hypothesis that bad loans are costly to reduce, because loan review and monitoring
expenses are high. This result is inconsistent with Jensen’s agency hypothesis that management
will engage in inefficient behavior by investing in more risky assets..
Capitalization is consistently negatively related to inefficiency across all 4 size classes of
banks. This indicates that as capital increases, banks become less inefficient. That is, well
capitalized banks tend to be better run, and this is reflected in the efficiency measures.
Loan growth is statistically significant and non linearly related to inefficiency. For the
smallest size banks, higher loan growth is related to less inefficiency, which is inconsistent with
the moral hazard hypothesis.
9 However, for the larger size banks, once loan growth exceeds
16%, 18% and 13% for banks in Groups 2, 3 and 4, respectively, then moral hazard behavior
8 The systems of three equations represented by equations (la)-(3a) meet the usual indentifiability requirements.
9 Similar results were found using asset growth rates.dominates the fact that institutions with moderate growth rates tend to be more efficient than
institutions with stagnant or low growth rates. That is, more rapidly growing institutions tend,
ceteris paribus, beyond a certain point, appear to be more inefficient than institutions with more
moderate growth rates.
B. The Asset Risk Equations
The asset risk equations examine the effects of asset choice, growth and inefficiencies on
loan risk. The hypothesis is that inefficiencies would induce institutions to reach for more risk and
engage in moral hazard behavior, and this appears to be the case. Institutions with greater
measured inefficiencies tend to have higher risk loans. In contrast to the inefficiency equations,
estimated relationships are consistent with the agency cost and moral hazard hypothesis that
inefficient institutions take on more asset risk. The result also points out the asymmetry between
the effects of risk on inefficiencies from the inefficiency equation and the effects of inefficiencies
on asset risk from the BADLOAN equation. The ability to separate the two effects is an
improvement upon the single equation results found in Kwan and Eisenbeis(1995) which
emphasized only the effects of risk taking on inefficiencies.
Growth appears to bear a different relationship to risk for small institutions than for larger
institutions. For small institutions, growth below 23°/0 for institutions in Group 1 and 13°/0 for
institutions in Group 2 is risk increasing. For institutions with 5 year growth rates in excess of
these amounts, growth is associated with reduced loan risk. Whether this is the result of a few
outliers created by mergers or confirms the views of bank examiners, that institutions experiencing
hyper growth tend to be very risky, remains to be determined. For institutions in Group 3 growthis statistically insignificantly related related to asset risk and for institutions in the largest size
class, growth is negatively related to loan risk. Again, this result is inconsistent with the agency
and information hypotheses that managers will trade off growth for risk in order to increase their
own perquisite consumption and compensation.
C. Capitalization Equations
The last set of equations examine the relationships between capitalization, returns and
inefficiency. The measured effects of inefficiencies are statistically negative and significant,
suggesting that institutions with greater inefficiencies are less well capitalized, which is consistent
with the moral hazard hypothesis and risk taking hypothesis identified in the BADLOAN
equation. Except for the small size class of banks, imposition of regulatory capital requirements
was insignificantly related to bank capitalization. In the case of small banks, the sign is negative
and wrong, indicating that after the imposition of the Basle capital requirements, bank capital
went down, rather than increased. ROA is positive and significantly related to capital, which is
consistent with the results of Furlong and Keeley(1990) and Keeley and Furlong(1989).
V. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper a simultaneous equation approach was taken to examining the trade offs
between risk, inefficiency and capitalization. The results confirm the belief that these three
variables are simultaneously determined. Furthermore, asymmetries were identified in the
relationship between risk and inefficiencies. Support was found in the asset risk equations for the
hypothesis that less efficient institutions also took on more risk to off set this inefficiency, therebytransferring risk to the deposit insurance funds. Similarly, less efficient institutions tended to be
less well capitalized, a result that may also be associated with differences in management quality.
Finally, the empirical results tend to support the hypothesis of Hughes, Lang, Mester and Moon,
that risk averse managers tend to expend real resources to reduce asset risk, which makes them
appear to be inefficient, when compared to efficiency measures derived under the assumption of
risk neutrality.
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Economics, 26, 1990, pp. 3-27.Table 1. Simultaneous equation estimates for inefficiencies, risk and capitalizationAppendix: The Stochastic Translog Cost Function
The stochastic translog cost function employed is of the form:
(1)
is a two component disturbance term of the form:
(2)
   is the controllable component of the
Following Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt [1982], the measure of controllable
firm inefficiency can be expressed as:respectively.
where TC is
prices. Five
total operating  costs (including interest costs), Qi are
measures of banking output are included. They are
(4)
outputs, and Pj are input
book value of investment
securities (Q 1 ), book value of real estate loans (Q2), book value of commercial and industrial
loans (Q3), book value of consumer loans (Q4), and off-balance sheet commitments and
contingencies (Q5) (which include loan commitments, letters-of-credit (both commercial and
standby), futures and forward contracts, and notional value of outstanding interest rate swaps).
Three input prices are utilized. They include the unit price of capital (P1), measured as total
occupancy expenses divided by fixed plant and equipment; the unit cost of funds (P2), defined as
total interest expenses divided by total deposits, borrowed funds, and subordinated notes and
debentures; and the unit price of labor (P3), defined as total wages and salaries
number of full time equivalent employees. The linear homogeneity restrictions,
divided by theare imposed by normalizing total costs and input prices by the price of labor. To allow the cost
function to vary across size classes, the sample banking firms are first sorted into size-based
quartiles according to average total assets between 1986 and 1991. Assuming the cost function
to be stationary over time, pool time-series cross-section observations are used to estimate the
stochastic cost function separately for each size-based quartile by the method of maximum
sample firm in each sample period to measure firm-specific X-inefficiencies.
Summary statistics on banking outputs, input prices, total assets, and total costs for the
254 sample firms are reported in Table 2. Both firm size and the cost function variables are highly
skewed, indicating the desirability of grouping firms into size classes. Although not reported in
Table 2, off-balance sheet activities tend to be concentrated in the larger firms in the sample. This
suggests that the cost function of large banking firms may potentially be different from those of
smaller firms.Table 2
Data summary for 254 bank holding companies, based on semiannual data from 1986 to 1991.
a in thousands of dollars.
bin thousands of dollars per full time equivalent employee.
c in thousands of dollars per thousands of dollars of fixed assets.
din thousands of dollars per thousands of dollars of deposits and borrowed fund.
e include loan commitments, letters of credit, futures and forward contracts, and notional
value of outstanding interest rate swaps.